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1 
THE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT: 
WHAT YOU SEE AND WHAT YOU GET 
ROBIN R. COCKEY∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal statutes seldom make for good reading, and in the boring 
statutes sweepstakes, the text of the Family Medical Leave Act 
(“FMLA”)1 ranks right up there with its acronymic sibling, the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).2 
The dry, arcane language of the FMLA conveys little of the drama 
which led to its enactment and none of the emotional pizzazz with 
which it resonates in the courtroom.  Perhaps only the handful of 
lawyers who have stood before a jury seeking redress for a client 
whose boss did not care about “family values” knows how compelling 
an FMLA claim can be. 
In essence, the FMLA serves wholesome, widely-held ideals: the 
statute simply guarantees that a big employer, who presumably can 
afford it, accommodate employees taking time off to meet the most 
pressing needs of their immediate family.  It seems safe to assume that 
average Americans, (including those who make their way onto juries), 
have sympathy for employees who serve their families by taking FMLA 
leave and have little patience with employers who get in the way.  But 
gaining access to the courtroom for an FMLA plaintiff often takes too 
long for the statute’s leave provisions to serve their intended 
                                                          
∗  Mr. Cockey is a partner in the Salisbury, Maryland firm of Cockey, Brennan, & 
Maloney.  In Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001), he served as lead 
trial counsel for Plaintiff and argued the case before the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit during its first 2001 appeal.  Mr. Cockey wishes to 
acknowledge the contributions of Mary Wyckoff, Sara L. Mandelbaum, and Andrew 
Freeman, who also represented Plaintiff Kevin Knussman, and in particular wishes to 
extend the highest praise to Deborah A. Jeon, Eastern Shore Regional Attorney for 
the American Civil Liberties Union, who organized the Knussman legal team and 
remained as its presiding strategist.  The author also wishes to thank his partners, 
Mark Brennan and Thomas Maloney, for cheerfully supporting ten years of 
unremunerative litigation. 
 1. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (1994). 
 2. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2003). 
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purpose,3 and enabling the jury to express its sympathy monetarily 
requires the crafting of hybrid suits combining FMLA claims with 
other claims in which emotional distress damages and punitive 
damages are available. 
In the end, unfortunately, the fulfillment of the FMLA’s goals of 
helping  workers spend time addressing family and medical needs and  
justly compensating them for damage caused by obstructive employers 
precariously depends on legal stratagems.  As drafted, the law is but 
an  imperfect vehicle for reaching its objectives and reform of the 
statute is needed. 
CORE PROVISIONS OF THE FMLA 
The FMLA gives a qualified employee up to twelve weeks of leave 
annually, which the employee may use to address medical crises and 
certain important family events.4  Generally, FMLA coverage is 
unavailable to persons employed by small businesses because the 
statute applies to those businesses that employ fifty or more full-time 
workers during twenty or more calendar work weeks in a year.5  FMLA 
coverage is also unavailable to new hires.6  An eligible employee must 
have worked for at least twelve months, for at least 1250 hours during 
the year preceding the start of leave, and at a work site where the 
employer employs at least fifty workers within a seventy-five mile 
radius.7 
                                                          
 3. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (b)(1)-(5) (conveying Congressional intent to impart a 
means of balancing an individual’s personal and professional lives by providing a 
leave of absence that does not hinder the economic integrity of employers). 
 4. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). 
[A]n eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of leave 
during any 12-month period for one or more of the following: (A) Because of 
the birth of a son or daughter of the employee and in order to care for such 
son or daughter. (B) Because of placement of a son or daughter with the 
employee for adoption or foster care. (C) In order to care for the spouse, or 
a son or daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, 
or parent has a serious health condition. (D) Because of a serious health 
condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the 
position of such employee. 
Id. 
 5. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (defining “employer” as “any person engaged 
in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or 
more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks 
in the current or preceding calendar year. . . .”). 
 6. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2) (defining eligible employees). 
 7. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2) (A)-(B)(ii). 
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The medical leave benefits protected by the FMLA are connected to 
the concept of a “serious health condition.”8  Under the statute, an 
employee may take leave because of the employee’s own “serious 
health condition,” if that condition makes the employee unable to 
perform the essential functions of the job.9  The employee may also 
take medical leave to care for a spouse, daughter, son, or parent 
suffering from a “serious health condition.”10  Although the 
definition of a “serious health condition” as it has evolved under the 
statute11 and implementing regulations is far from exact, it seems 
clear that any illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental 
condition involving either hospitalization, or a period of medical care 
extending more than three consecutive calendar days, will fit the 
bill.12 
The FMLA also provides limited family leave benefits.  Under the 
statute, a covered employee may take family leave in connection with 
the birth of the employee’s child, or the placement of a child with the 
employee for adoption or foster care.13 
Although the FMLA requires that leave be made available under 
the requisite circumstances, there is no statutory requirement that an 
eligible employee be paid while taking leave.  The significant 
exception to the FMLA’s norm of unpaid leave is the statutory 
provision that accrued paid leave benefits may be applied, either at 
the insistence of the employee or the employer, towards the twelve 
week FMLA leave “ration.”14  While the FMLA does not permit an 
employee to “stack” FMLA leave by first exhausting paid leave and 
then commencing twelve weeks of unpaid FMLA leave, an employee 
may take as much of the FMLA leave period with pay as is covered by 
accrued paid leave benefits.15 
The FMLA imposes substantial responsibilities upon employers to 
ensure their workers are aware of FMLA benefits.  The covered 
employer must post a notice of FMLA benefits in the work place, e.g. 
                                                          
 8. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (defining “serious health condition” as “an illness, 
injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves –- (A) inpatient care 
in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment 
by a health care provider.”). 
 9. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). 
 10. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). 
 11. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (a)(2)(2004) (delineating the term “serious health 
condition” for purposes of FMLA). 
 12. Id. 
 13. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(B). 
 14. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (c), (d). 
 15. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (d). 
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on a bulletin board, in the lunchroom, etc.16  When an employee 
requests leave in connection with a potentially covered benefit, i.e., 
the employee’s own serious health condition, the serious health 
condition of a family member, or the birth or placement of a child,17 
the employer must inform the employee that FMLA leave may be 
available and assist the employee in making the application.18  The 
employer must refrain from harassing or retaliating against employees 
exercising FMLA rights.19  Employees returning from FMLA leave 
must be given their old jobs back, and, of course, may not be 
subjected to punitive measures such as demotion, reduction in pay or 
termination.20 
The remedies available under the FMLA are quite limited: neither 
punitive damages nor damages for emotional distress are available.21  
Damages are confined to pecuniary losses, although—absent a good 
faith defense—“liquidated damages” of twice the plaintiff’s pecuniary 
loss may be obtained.22  As with most remedial federal statutes, a 
prevailing plaintiff can collect reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.23  
Injunctive and declaratory relief may be obtained under the FMLA,24 
but, because there is no effective administrative procedure established 
for handling complaints, the injunctive relief must generally be 
deferred until the end of a protracted judicial proceeding, and 
therefore typically comes too late to be of much practical value. 
KNUSSMAN V. MARYLAND: AN FMLA CASE STUDY 
The strengths and weaknesses of the FMLA are vividly highlighted 
in the case of Knussman v. Maryland.25  In Knussman, a proud, new 
father denied parental leave on the basis of his gender succeeded in 
compelling his governmental employer to provide the leave and to 
                                                          
 16. 29 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994). 
 17. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). 
 18. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.301(c), 825.302(c) (requiring employers to ensure that 
employees apply for FMLA leave whenever appropriate, even without the employee’s 
initiative). 
 19. 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (1994). 
 20. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a) (1994). 
 21. 29 U.S.C. § 2617, n. 13 (1994). 
 22. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i). 
 23. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3). 
 24. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(B). 
 25. 935 F. Supp. 659 (D. Md. 1996), motion for summary judgment granted in 
part, denied in part by 16 F. Supp. 2d 601 (D. Md. 1998), motion for new trial 
granted in part, denied in part by 65 F. Supp. 2d 353 (D. Md. 1999), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, by 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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compensate him for the attendant emotional distress; on the surface, 
the benevolent objectives of the statute were achieved.  Unfortunately, 
however, Trooper Knussman spent five years to get the leave and 
eight years to get the money.  In fact, the award of attorney’s fees and 
costs as well as the separate awards for post-judgment interest, 
supplemental attorney’s fees, and costs incurred during the final 
phase of litigation remain unpaid, pending a remand by the United 
Stated Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.26  Ironically, a case 
brought under a statute designed to provide timely relief for life’s 
most pressing emergencies has now outlasted the Trojan War’s nine-
year duration.27  There is perhaps no better way to gain insight into 
the difficulties of FMLA implementation than to retrace the 
Knussman case’s long trek through the courts. 
The story of the Knussman case begins in the spring of 1994.28  At 
that time, Trooper Kevin Knussman and his wife Kim learned that, 
two years after their decision to start a family, they were finally 
“expecting.”29  Their joy was soon dampened by the discovery that 
Kim had developed preeclampsia, a potentially life threatening 
syndrome, which sometimes mysteriously accompanies pregnancy and 
involves extremely high blood pressure.30  The Knussmans’ 
realization that Kim’s pregnancy would be complicated brought them 
to the brink of a dilemma. 
The Knussmans were life-long residents of Maryland’s Eastern 
Shore, an area known for its bedrock conservatism and for family 
values of the most traditional sort.  Kevin Knussman was a Maryland 
State Trooper with fifteen years service, assigned as a paramedic to the 
helicopter-borne, Aviation Division (the “Division”).31  Kevin was a 
Republican, a fundamentalist Christian and a die-hard law and order 
man who idolized the agency for whom he worked.32  As a part of his 
company man life-style, Kevin had taken few vacations and had 
accrued a plethora of unused leave.33  When confronted with the 
                                                          
 26. Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 642 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 27. See Symposium, The New Glass Ceiling: Litigating Bias Against Parents at 
Work 41 (Jan. 24, 2003) (unpublished symposium presentations) (on file with 
American University, Washington College of Law: The Program on Gender, Work & 
Family) [hereinafter Symposium] (conveying the Knussman legal team and family’s 
desire to undergo “torture at the hands of the CIA” than additional litigation). 
 28. Knussman v. Maryland, 16 F. Supp. 2d 601, 605 (D. Md. 1998). 
 29. See Symposium, supra note 27, at 39. 
 30. Knussman, 272 F.3d at 648 (Lee, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 31. See Symposium, supra note 27, at 44-45 (reflecting that he would continue as 
a full time State Trooper for only a few more years after the birth of his first child). 
 32. See id. at 39-44. 
 33. See id. 
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compelling need to provide care for a newborn, for whom his 
debilitated wife could not provide, and being given the cherished 
opportunity to be on hand during his child’s infancy, Trooper 
Knussman made the difficult decision to seek as much leave as 
possible from his employer.34 
In October of 1994, Kevin Knussman went to his boss and 
requested four to eight weeks leave to begin at the birth of his child, 
the amount which, in his experience, was the most the Maryland State 
Police would ever approve.35  A few days after he submitted his leave 
request, Trooper Knussman happened to be at the Aviation Division, 
where his boss, the ranking officer in flight operations, stopped him 
in the hallway.36  There, in front of a small group of onlookers, 
Knussman’s boss told him there was no way he was going to get more 
than two weeks off.37 
Shortly after this rebuff, Kim Knussman’s doctors decided her 
medical condition had reached a crisis, and ordered her to complete 
bed rest.38  When Kim’s condition failed to improve, she entered the 
hospital on November 24, and remained there until she gave birth to 
Paige on December 9, 1994.39 
Meanwhile, Kevin Knussman seemingly had a breakthrough.  On 
December 2, he received a teletype from a State Police Leave 
Specialist describing the newly enacted Maryland “nurturing leave” 
provision.40  Under this state statute, an employee “who is responsible 
for the care and nurturing of a child may use, without certification of 
illness or disability, up to thirty days of accrued sick leave to care for 
the child” following the child’s birth or placement for adoption, while 
an employee secondarily responsible may take up to ten days of 
accrued sick leave.41  Trooper Knussman immediately called the 
                                                          
 34. See id. (noting that Knussman viewed his substantial accumulated leave time 
as being in his favor when he requested leave). 
 35. See id. at 45 (noting that even four to eight weeks might have been excessive 
if not for his accumulated leave time). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See id. (noting that Knussman’s supervisor called the leave request “a bunch 
of crap,” and stated that even the two weeks would be without pay). 
 38. Knussman, 272 F.3d at 628 (resulting in her confinement for the latter stages 
of the pregnancy prior to delivery). 
 39. See Knussman, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 606 (noting that Kim Knussman “endur[ed] 
severe medical problems” up until the delivery and was unable to care for the 
newborn as a result of ongoing post-delivery complications). 
 40. MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 7-508(a)(1) (1994), amended by MD. 
CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 9-505 (2002) (allowing parents to more equally 
share time off); see also Knussman, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 606. 
 41. § 9-505. 
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Leave Specialist, told her he would be the person primarily 
responsible for taking care of his child, and asked if he would qualify 
for thirty days of leave under the new law.42  The Leave Specialist 
responded that he could not take thirty days off because only women 
can be primary care providers for a newborn child.43  When 
Knussman protested that the interpretation seemed sexist, the 
Specialist told him that was the way it had to be because only a woman 
could breast-feed a baby.44 
After Paige’s birth, Kim Knussman continued to experience 
pregnancy-induced high blood pressure, complicated by extreme 
physical weakness and a variety of other health complications.45  As 
the doctors had feared, Kevin Knussman found himself doing it all, 
taking care not only of the newborn infant but of his bedridden wife 
as well.46  Faced with this harsh reality, Kevin Knussman again sought 
to challenge his employer’s determination that he was entitled to only 
ten days of “nurturing leave” as a “secondary care giver.”47  On 
December 20, he contacted his supervisor and asked the Division to 
reconsider its determination that males could not qualify as primary 
care givers under the statute.48  After checking with upper 
management, Knussman’s supervisor told him that the Leave 
Specialist had been right: only women could be primary care 
providers.49 
The morning before Trooper Knussman was to return to work, he 
again telephoned the Leave Specialist who had previously turned him 
down.50 Knussman explained to her that he needed additional leave 
under the Nurturing Leave Statute because of his wife’s continuing 
convalescence and Paige’s needs.51  This time, with some asperity, the 
Leave Specialist said: “God made women to have babies and, unless 
                                                          
 42. Knussman, 272 F.3d at 628-29. 
 43. Knussman, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 606 (stating that, according to Knussman, the 
Leave Specialist advised him that only birth mothers qualified as primary care givers). 
 44. See id. at 614, n.9 (adding that only if the mother were in a coma or dead 
would Knussman qualify as the primary care giver). 
 45. See id. at 606 (conveying that one of Mrs. Knussman’s physicians submitted a 
letter relaying her ongoing medical problems that made her unable to care for the 
baby and required Knussman to provide assistance for at least twenty more days). 
 46. See id. (noting Knussman attempted to provide medical evidence as to his 
wife’s inability to care for the child on two separate occassions). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. (noting that the division dismissed Knussman’s request even after he 
submitted a letter from his wife’s second doctor). 
 50. Knussman, 272 F.3d at  629. 
 51. Id. at 629-30. 
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[you] could have a baby, there is no way [you] could be [the] primary 
care [giver].”52  And so, Kevin Knussman returned to work.53 
At no point during this two-month leave dialogue did any state 
official suggest to Trooper Knussman that, irrespective of his rights 
under Maryland personnel law, he could apply his accrued paid leave 
benefits towards his twelve-week FMLA leave entitlement.54  
Knussman had apparently heard of the FMLA, but he was under the 
mistaken impression that FMLA leave was necessarily without pay.55 
As a result of his leave denial, Kevin Knussman filed his first 
grievance in more than a decade-long career as a state trooper.56  
When this grievance floundered, perhaps because one of the same 
officials involved in the original decision to deny Knussman 
adjudicated the grievance,57 Trooper Knussman filed a discrimination 
complaint with the state police’s Fair Practices Officer, Lieutenant 
Namon Brown.58  Lieutenant Brown issued a written decision 
upholding Knussman’s complaint: 
The Maryland State Police had no regulations or rules which would 
prohibit TFC Knussman from receiving his entitled thirty days of 
sick leave after the birth or adoption of a child. . . .  The 
Department should have allowed TFC Knussman the usage of the 
full thirty days sick leave. . . .  I think the intent of [the Leave 
Specialist’s] conversation [with TFC  Knussman] was meant to be 
negative and to discourage TFC Knussman  from following up on 
any additional means to force the Department to  do what is proper 
and just.59 
When Lieutenant Brown issued this decision, Kim Knussman was 
still in poor health, and Paige was still in diapers.60  In short, the 
                                                          
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 630. 
 54. See id. at 628 (stating that First Sergeant Ronnie P. Creel “misinformed” 
Knussman that the FMLA did not entitle Knussman to any paid leave beyond the two 
weeks that Creel would permit). 
 55. See Knussman, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 606 (noting Knussman’s claim that he never 
knew that he could apply paid leave to FMLA leave because his employer neither 
posted the FMLA notice nor informed him of his rights under the FMLA when 
Knussman made his first request). 
 56. Symposium, supra note 27, at 46. 
 57. See id. (observing that Captain David Czorapinski, who had originally told 
Knussman’s supervisor that the “primary care giver” was presumed to be the mother, 
determined after a hearing on that issue that Knussman failed to provide sufficient 
evidence of his primary care giver status). 
 58. See Joint Appendix at 1207, Memorandum from Lt. Namon Brown, Fair 
Practices Officer, Knussman, 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Symposium, supra note 27, at 46 (stating that Kim Knussman’s pregnancy, 
delivery, and post-partum recovery were difficult and left her bedridden for a long 
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Knussman family could still have benefited from the twenty additional 
days permitted under the state law for a primary care provider.61  
Such was not to be the Knussmans’ lot, however, because Trooper 
Knussman did not receive Lieutenant Brown’s decision at the time, 
and the Division took no action as a result of Brown’s decision.62  In 
fact, the Knussman family learned of the decision only after 
Knussman’s lawyers retrieved it from a pile of documents produced by 
the Division during the discovery phase of the ensuing litigation, years 
later.63 
A detailed account of the state police’s handling of Trooper 
Knussman’s grievances, fair practices complaints, and other concerns 
makes a long, circuitous story resembling a strange mixture of Kafka64 
and Arthur Koestler.65  Stung by his  superior’s dismissal to resolve 
the dispute as “a bunch of crap,”66 Knussman filed suit in April of 
1995.67 
The route Trooper Knussman took to the U.S. District Court in 
Baltimore typifies the cross-political, unifying appeal of “family 
values.”68  Knussman, a conservative Christian and volunteer on local 
Republican campaigns, a man who had reached his forties without 
ever being involved in a lawsuit, sought the aid of the Centreville 
American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU].69  The ACLU’s regional 
manager, Deborah Jeon, quickly assembled a legal team comprising
                                                          
time). 
 61. See id. (observing that, when Knussman’s secondary care giver leave time ran 
out, he made a “desperate” telephone call to the Leave Specialist to ask for more 
time). 
 62. See id. (noting that Lieutenant Brown’s favorable decision “immediately got 
buried” and that this officer was then transferred because he allegedly “didn’t do his 
job”). 
 63. Id. at 40. 
 64. See FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 35-224 (Breon Mitchell trans., Schocken Books 
1998) (1925) (depicting the protracted and bureaucratic nature of the legal 
proceedings that haunt the protagonist, Josef K., after the police arrest him for an 
unnamed crime). 
 65. See SIDNEY KINGSLEY & ARTHUR KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT NOON 87-117 (Random 
House 1951) (1950) (presenting a theatrical rendering of the tortuous and 
dehumanizing interrogation and subsequent trial of a prisoner accused by Soviet 
authorities of “counter-revolutionary” activities). 
 66. See Symposium, supra note 27, at 35. 
 67. See Knussman, 935 F. Supp. at 662. 
 68. See Symposium, supra note 27, at 38 (observing that the concept of “family 
values” receives strong support from both ends of the political spectrum). 
 69. See id. at 47 (describing the high legal fees that Knussman initially 
encountered when he contacted a for-profit attorney, and tracing the thought process 
that led him to call the ACLU). 
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herself, a local trial lawyer, and a gender discrimination specialist 
from the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project in New York.70 
Knussman’s legal team soon filed suit, albeit with the expectation 
that the obvious merit of Knussman’s claim would yield a prompt 
settlement.71  Instead, Fabian defense tactics, combined with the 
difficulties of interpreting a new law and the inherent delays in the 
American judicial system, had the Knussmans starring in an endless 
legal epic of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce72 proportions.73  The good news was 
that the case’s long journey through the courts produced a series of 
trenchant published opinions by District Court Judge Walter E. Black, 
Jr. that provided much-needed guidance in mapping the FMLA’s 
terra incognita.74 
The complaint initially filed on behalf of Trooper Knussman, which 
relied upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the federal law allowing civil actions 
for the deprivation of rights,75 asserted claims under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment76 and the FMLA.77  
The combination of the two claims was crucial because emotional 
distress damages, though unavailable under the FMLA, were available 
for a constitutional claim. 78 
Following a motion to dismiss, the District Court held in the first 
Knussman decision that Congress did not intend the FMLA to be a 
sufficiently exhaustive statutory scheme as to preclude an unrelated § 
                                                          
 70. Id. at 51. 
 71. See id. at 47 (stating that, as soon as Knussman contacted the ACLU and 
described his claim, the ACLU said, “this looks great,” and agreed to help him). 
 72. See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 20-23 (Penguin Books 1964) (1853) 
(describing a lengthy chancery suit, “Jarndyce and Jarndyce,” which had “in [the] 
course of time, become so complicated that no man alive knows what it means.”). 
 73. See Symposium, supra note 27, at 47-50 (noting that the filing of the legal 
challenge triggered a flurry of aggressive media coverage and prompted the Maryland 
State Police to vigorously deny the allegations and conduct “invasive discovery” into 
virtually every aspect of Knussman’s life). 
 74. See, e.g., Knussman v. Maryland, 65 F. Supp. 2d 353, 361 (D. Md. 1999) 
(warning that the Leave Specialist’s application of “widely-held stereotypical 
assumptions and understandings of parenting does not make it reasonable to act 
according to those assumptions and violate the basic [tenets] of equal protection 
law”). 
 75. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) (declaring that “[e]very person who under color of 
any statute . . . subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . .  
to the deprivation of any rights, . . . secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to 
the party injured in an action at law.”). 
 76. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV § 1 (stating that the government may not “deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). 
 77. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (1994). 
 78. In the face of Maryland precedent holding that the State’s ERA did not give 
rise to a private cause of action, Knussman voluntarily dismissed his third claim, which 
his legal team filed under Maryland’s ERA. 
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1983 claim for the same underlying misconduct.79  In assessing 
defendant’s Eleventh Amendment immunity claim, the District Court 
ruled that the State and the supervisors named as individual 
defendants in their official capacities were entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity as to the Equal Protection claim.80  The court 
ruled that Congress intended to waive Eleventh Amendment 
immunity as to the FMLA and held the defendants were not entitled 
to Eleventh Amendment immunity as to the FMLA.81 
The Court’s ruling cleared the way for discovery, which proceeded 
laboriously and exhaustively for two years.  At the close of discovery, 
on cross motions for summary judgment, the District Court issued its 
second reported decision.82  In this decision, the District Court ruled, 
regarding the FMLA claim, that the individual defendants were 
entitled to qualified immunity, a defense only available to officials 
sued in their individual capacities.83  Although the individual 
defendants remained liable as to all relief sought on the FMLA claim 
in their official capacities, they were not liable in their individual 
capacities.84  In the wake of the ruling, the Knussman case finally went 
forward to trial. 
On January 19, 1999, the Knussman case, seeking, inter alia, an 
injunction mandating leave to care for the newborn who was now four 
years old, went to trial before Judge Black and a jury drawn principally 
from the Baltimore-Washington metropolitan area.85  During the 
ensuing eleven-day trial, the jury heard extensive testimony from 
Trooper Knussman’s friends, family and, perhaps most significantly, 
State Police co-workers. The witnesses emphasized Knussman’s 
devotion to his job and family, and the devastating impact of his 
employers’ sexist refusal to allow him to address his family’s pressing 
                                                          
 79. Knussman, 935 F. Supp. at 667. 
 80. Id. at 662. 
 81. Id. at 664 (noting that the defendants had not briefed or in any way pressed 
the issue of whether there had been a valid waiver). 
 82. Knussman, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 601. 
 83. Id. at 610 (holding that qualified immunity is available to all defendants 
because the rights under FMLA were not so clear that the defendants should have 
known the rights were violated). 
 84. Id. at 615 (finding some defendants liable in their official capacities). 
 85. Interestingly, there were no jurors from Knussman’s native Eastern Shore.  In 
Maryland, a highly regionalized state, such distinctions are significant since the 
Eastern Shore and the lower part of the Western Shore are overwhelmingly rural, 
conservative, and “Southern.”  See Margaret Shapiro, Maryland Voters More Liberal 
on Social Issues, Poll Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1982, at C1 (indicating that Baltimore 
and Washington have big liberal voting blocks, as opposed to the Eastern Shore, parts 
of Anne Arundel County, and Western Maryland).  The Baltimore-Washington area is 
highly urbanized and, at least by popular perception, teeming with liberals.  See id. 
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needs on Knussman, “the family man” and “the company man.”  The 
Plaintiff also presented extensive medical testimony that established 
not only the severity of Kim Knussman’s pregnancy-related illness, but 
also the severity of Kevin Knussman’s own near-breakdown.86 
The medical testimony by Trooper Knussman’s own health-care 
providers gave strong clinical corroboration to the abundant lay 
testimony of the emotional distress manifested by Kevin Knussman.87  
Knussman’s family physician testified that Kevin had come to him, 
concerned that he was experiencing symptoms of an approaching 
heart attack; the physician determined that what was really wrong with 
Knussman was a bad case of anxiety and suggested he consult a 
psychologist.88  Trooper Knussman ignored his doctor’s advice until, 
upon reading about the symptoms of depression in a popular 
magazine, he realized he “fit the bill,” recollected his doctor’s advice, 
and belatedly sought a referral to a psychologist.  The psychologist 
testified at trial as to the lengthy period of counseling Trooper 
Knussman underwent and as to anti-depressant medication a 
cooperating psychiatrist prescribed.89  The psychologist explained 
that Trooper Knussman’s deep sense of betrayal and frustration at 
being unable to provide for his family in a time of great emotional 
and personal need led him into a truly profound depression in which 
he at one point experienced suicidal ideation.90 
Defendants presented no countervailing expert testimony.  Instead, 
the defendants’ trial testimony seemed designed to establish that they 
attempted in good faith to interpret the new legislation, although 
they did little to contradict the shockingly crass statements attributed 
to them by Knussman.  As such, on February 2, after two hours of 
deliberation, the jury returned its verdict and entered judgment in 
favor of Knussman for $375,000.91  They also found, however, that all 
the individual defendants except the Leave Specialist, who personally 
rebuffed Knussman’s request, were entitled to qualified immunity.92 
                                                          
 86. Knussman, 272 F.3d at 640. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 641, n.11. 
 90. Id. at 641. 
 91. Knussman, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 355. 
 92. See Symposium, supra note 27, at 49 (noting that in a comic-opera epilogue 
to the trial, the State Police informed Trooper Knussman that, in light of trial 
testimony about the severity of his emotional distress, he would be suspended from 
duty until he had passed a psychiatric fitness for duty evaluation).  When pressed for 
clarification, the State Police asserted that he would be permitted to perform highway 
patrol duty but not paramedic functions, thus leaving him in the odd predicament of 
being authorized to shoot suspects if necessary but not to provide them with first aid.  
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In post-trial motions, Defendants moved to set aside the judgment 
on the grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity, among other 
things.93  The District Court rejected Knussman’s argument that the 
Defendants had waived immunity, and vacated the jury’s monetary 
award as to all Defendants except the State’s Leave Specialist, in her 
individual capacity.94  Meanwhile, the Court gave Knussman a wide 
panoply of injunctive relief, including the directive that he finally be 
given the leave his Division deprived him of five years before.95 
Trooper Knussman’s initial reaction to the District Court’s ruling 
was alarm that the State might refuse to indemnify the Leave 
Specialist, a decision which would probably have forced her into 
bankruptcy and left the Knussmans without the jury awarded 
damages.  Providentially, the State’s Board of Public Works, a 
triumvirate consisting of the Governor, Comptroller and Treasurer of 
Maryland,96 unanimously voted to indemnify its employee.  
Meanwhile, the State prosecuted an appeal to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Richmond.97 
On appeal, the Defendants mounted a scatter-gun attack on almost 
every aspect of the case’s District Court phase.  On January 26, 2001, 
the case finally came for oral argument before a panel consisting of 
Circuit Court Judges Karen Williams and William Traxler, and 
specially assigned District Court Judge Gerald Bruce Lee, of the 
Eastern District of Virginia.98  During oral argument, the panel 
focused exclusively upon whether the Leave Specialist against whom 
the judgment remained pending should have been given qualified 
                                                          
Id.  After a flurry of motions, the issue was obviated by Trooper Knussman’s decision 
to avail himself of an early retirement option coincidentally approved by the 
Maryland legislature.  Id. 
 93. Knussman, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 355 (conveying that Defendants also moved to 
set aside the judgment claiming the damages were excessive and that the Leave 
Specialist was entitled to qualified immunity). 
 94. See id. at 359 (refusing to consider the State’s submission to trial without first 
raising an Eleventh Amendment defense as a valid waiver of its sovereign immunity 
defense).  The Court expressed its unwillingness to impinge on the jury’s verdict 
because Plaintiff presented ample evidence of emotional distress.  Id. at 360.  The 
Court granted the qualified immunity privilege to all Defendants except the Leave 
Specialist because it was reasonable for the Plaintiff to rely wholly on the Leave 
Specialist’s interpretation of the law.  Id. at 360-61.  If argued today, the State’s 
Eleventh Amendment immunity claim would still prevail, despite the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 
1985 (2003), because the claim was directed against the damages awarded to the 
plaintiff under his Equal Protection and Section 1983 claim, and did not pertain to 
his claim for equitable and declaratory relief under the FMLA. 
 95. Id. at 355. 
 96. See MD. CONST. art. XII (creating the Maryland Board of Public Works). 
 97. Knussman, 272 F.3d at 625. 
 98. Id. at 627. 
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immunity based upon the reasonable expectation that a civil servant, 
in December 1994, should have known that parental leave laws should 
apply on a gender-neutral basis.  In its opinion released November 7, 
2001,99 the Court of Appeals had little difficulty concluding that the 
Leave Specialist who denied Knussman’s request should have known 
that the child-nurturing leave law applied gender neutrally, and that 
she was therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.100  However, on 
a 2-1 split (with Judge Lee dissenting), the panel ruled that the jury, 
in awarding Trooper Knussman damages for emotional distress, 
impermissibly compensated him for stress related to the litigation 
process, and not the initial leave denial.101  The Court vacated the 
jury award and remanded the case for a new trial as to damages 
only.102 
Faced with the mind-numbing prospect of retrying half of a case, 
three years after the original trial and eight years after the facts giving 
rise to the case, all parties agreed to waive a jury trial and permit 
Judge Black to assess damages based on the existing record.103  After 
briefing and oral argument, Judge Black, on August 27, 2002, 
delivered his opinion.  Severely limited by the damages analysis 
contained in the Fourth Circuit Opinion, Judge Black awarded 
Plaintiff $40,000 in compensatory damages.104  However, explicitly 
rejecting Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff was “only minimally 
successful,” he awarded Plaintiff $556,897.30 in interim attorney’s fees 
and $59,151.99 in litigation costs.105 
Defendants reacted predictably to the District Court’s dichotomous 
opinion, promptly tendering a $40,000 check to cover Plaintiff’s 
damage award and appealing the award of fees and costs to the 
Fourth Circuit.106  Meanwhile, on April 9, 2003, the District Court 
issued two decisions, one directing that Defendants pay Trooper 
Knussman interest on his $40,000 judgment computed from the date 
                                                          
 99. Id. at 625. 
 100. See id. at 638-39 (finding the Leave Specialist’s actions in violation of clearly 
established constitutional law). 
 101. See id. at 640-42 (finding Knussman’s litigation-related distress to be too 
attenuated from the Leave Specialist’s violation of Knussman’s constitutional rights). 
 102. Id. at 642. 
 103. Knussman v. Maryland, 73 Fed. Appx. 608, 612 (4th Cir. 2003) (unpublished 
per curium opinion). 
 104. Id. at 614. 
 105. Id. at 611-12.  Defendants appealed the District Court’s award of attorney’s 
fees as excessive and the Fourth Circuit vacated the District Court’s ruling because the 
lack of significance of Knussman’s case as a legal matter warranted a significant 
reduction in his award of attorney’s fees.  Id. at 616. 
 106. See id. at 610. 
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of the original jury verdict, February 2, 1999 (approximately $6000), 
and the other awarding Knussman an additional $67,482.18 in 
attorney’s fees and costs incurred during the case’s remand to District 
Court.107  With the inexorability of Greek drama, appeals were 
promptly lodged with the Fourth Circuit.108 
In briefing the combined fee appeals before the Fourth Circuit, the 
Knussman legal team focused upon the substantial equitable and 
declaratory relief secured for its client—getting the leave!109  The 
Knussman team emphasized that the measure of review in fee cases is 
“a manifest abuse of discretion,” a comfortable standard for prevailing 
parties.110  And, Judge Black’s opinion seemed premised on sound 
precepts: on the one hand, Knussman prevailed in achieving all goals 
available under the statute, and, on the other, the more the 
Defendants chose to appeal the jury and bench verdicts, the larger 
attorney costs would become.111 
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis, however, took a divergent path: 
during oral arguments on May 8, 2003, the panel,112 focused with 
unnerving exclusivity upon the disparity between Plaintiff’s $40,000 
damage award and his award of fees and costs that totaled slightly 
under $700,000.  During oral argument, one of the Judges wondered 
aloud how the Court could publicly justify paying lawyers almost 
$700,000 to secure only $40,000 for their client.113  the Court of 
Appeals’ :sticker shock” concerning the disparity between the 
Knussman’s legal fees and the damages awarded manifested itself in 
the court’s ensuing unpublished opinion that vacated Knussman’s fee 
and cost awards entirely.114  The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the 
District Court “abused its discretion” in failing to adopt the State’s 
characterization of Trooper Knussman’s lawsuit as “only marginally 
successful when viewed in its entirety.”115  The fact that Knussman 
would never have received the leave to which he was entitled had he 
                                                          
 107. See id. at 616, n.6. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Brief for Appellee at 35, Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 
2001)(No. B-95-1255). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Knussman v. Maryland, 73 Fed. Appx. 608, 609 (4th Cir. 2001) (identifying 
the panel that again included Judges Williams and Traxler, who were joined by 
Senior Judge H. Emory Widener, Jr.). 
 113. See Symposium, supra note 27, at 41. 
 114. Knussman, 73 Fed. Appx. at 614. 
 115. Id. (using a somewhat subjective analysis of what Knussman gained through 
his counsel). 
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not brought his suit, through five difficult years, went largely 
unnoticed. 
What remains of the Knussman case- assessment of fees and costs- is 
now back before the District Court in Baltimore.  Judge Black, who 
presided over the case throughout its nine year history, has now 
retired, and the case has been assigned to another judge.116  What will 
happen now remains an unanswered—and to this writer, deeply 
interesting—question. 
What do Kevin Knussman and his family have to show for almost a 
decade of grievances, claims, complaints, motions, appeals, hearings, 
settlement conferences, and, in short, the whole wretched arsenal of 
modern “dispute resolution?”  Superficially, the Knussmans scored 
total victory: Kevin Knussman eventually got all the additional leave he 
demanded, he has been compensated in some measure for the 
emotional distress he suffered, and eventually he will collect at least 
some attorney’s fees and costs.117  Measured, however, against the 
fundamental criterion of whether Trooper Knussman achieved the 
FMLA’s goal of securing leave when needed, the Knussman litigation 
was a failure.118  To the Knussman family, who held steadfastly to their 
purpose throughout the long struggle, the value of their labors can be 
best seen in what they accomplished for others: employees who 
litigate FMLA and State leave claims no longer must forge a path 
through the wilderness. Judge Black’s three published decisions give 
needed definition to employee rights and employer obligations, and 
those decisions along with the publicity that attended the Knussman 
case, undoubtedly encouraged employers to toe the line.  
Significantly, when the Knussmans’ second child was born two years 
into the lawsuit, the State Police’s newly established leave procedures 
worked flawlessly: Trooper Knussman got his FMLA leave without a 
murmur. 
STRENGTHENING THE FMLA 
Congress did not enact the FMLA to give people time off from 
work.119  Instead, Congress enacted the legislation to enable workers 
                                                          
 116. See id. at 616 (remanding the case to the district court to determine the 
appropriate fees and costs consistent with this most recent opinion). 
 117. The adequacy of Judge Black’s $40,000 damage award is a bit of a vexed 
question.  In fairness to Judge Black, even in today’s world of headline verdicts, the 
strictness of the Fourth Circuit opinion would render unlikely any greater award with 
the strength to withstand appellate challenge. 
 118. One cannot help but reiterate that, had the State Police acted upon 
Lieutenant Naamon Brown’s courageous decision upholding Knussman’s Fair 
Practices complaint, the leave could have been provided when still useful. 
 119. See Symposium, supra note 27, at 34. 
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to respond to exigent family and medical needs.  While the means by 
which the statute attempts to accomplish its purpose requires 
employers to extend leave to employees who need to address the 
pressing circumstances covered by the statute,  calling the statute a 
“leave act” is a misnomer that confuses the means with the end.120  In 
this crucial respect the FMLA fails.  As evidenced by his enormous 
stockpile of accrued paid leave, Kevin Knussman was not an employee 
interested in taking a vacation.121  Instead, Trooper Knussman wanted 
to care for his sick wife and spend as much time as possible with his 
newborn,122 the importance of whose arrival had been magnified by 
long deferral.123  By the time Trooper Knussman won his suit under 
the FMLA, his “newborn” was in kindergarten and his wife had long 
since gone back to work, strong and healthy.124  Though Trooper 
Knussman ultimately got the time off mandated by the statute,125 the 
leave came far too late to serve the purposes facilitated by the statute. 
In the eyes of some, allowing successful FMLA plaintiffs like Kevin 
Knussman a deferred vacation might seem to have some 
compensatory value, but that assessment trivializes the family values 
served by the FMLA.  Moreover, such an assessment—again—confuses 
those values with the means provided to promote them:  Timely leave 
from the workplace. 
The principal difficulty in implementing the FMLA lies in 
fashioning an effective remedy: to achieve its goal of enabling an 
employee to leave the workplace and meet a compelling but 
ephemeral family or medical leave, there must exist a rapid-response 
procedure in which disputes over leave entitlement are resolved 
promptly.126  While some might argue that the statute facilitates such 
a process by eliminating any requirement that the aggrieved employee 
exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit, expecting 
                                                          
 120. See id. (explaining that the real objective of the FMLA is to allow individuals 
to spend time with a newborn infant or a dying family member – not to give them 
time off work). 
 121. See Knussman, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 606 (stating that Knussman had accrued 
over 1200 hours of paid sick leave and at least an additional 250 hours of 
accumulated “annual and personal leave”). 
 122. See Knussman, 272 F.3d at 628. 
 123. See Symposium, supra note 27, at 39 (conveying the Knussmans’ desire to 
have a child for a long time prior to Ms. Knussman’s pregnancy with Paige). 
 124. See id. (stating that Mr. Knussman did not actually receive his time off until 
five years after it was requested). 
 125. See id. at 40 (analogizing the outcome as the legal equivalent of throwing a 
lifeline to someone who already drowned). 
 126. See id. at 36 (emphasizing that grievances with the FMLA is a rare instance in 
which citizens can legitimately expect the Federal Governemnt to take prompt 
action). 
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employees to resolve leave disputes by filing suit in federal court and 
waging a bloody and expensive battle over a preliminary injunction is 
unrealistic, wasteful, and unfair.  A better approach would be for 
Congress to adopt legislation empowering the Department of Labor 
to establish a hotline procedure for an on-the-spot resolution of leave 
disputes.127  Resolving leave disputes through a quick, inexpensive 
arbitration would not only foster the FMLA’s goal of providing leave 
when necessary, but would obviate disputes over damages, costs, and 
monetary compensation.128 
Absent the creation of a mechanism to determine whether an 
employee is entitled to family or medical leave at a time when the 
employee can still use the leave, fairness dictates that the damage 
provisions of the FMLA be significantly enhanced.  In Kevin 
Knussman’s case, for example, the employer’s obstruction of an 
entirely valid leave request129 precipitated Trooper Knussman’s 
breakdown,130 which required lengthy psychotherapy and treatment 
with anti-depressants.131  The crisis of confidence the employer’s 
obstruction engendered in the ultra-conservative Trooper Knussman 
became so severe he even (briefly) contemplated suicide.132  Despite 
the profundity and clinical corroboration of his emotional distress, 
Trooper Knussman could not have recovered a penny if there was no 
sexist basis for the leave denial, which entitled him to relief under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause.133  If, hypothetically, 
Trooper Knussman’s Division denied him leave under circumstances 
that were equally offensive but did not implicate a suspect 
classification, his monetary remedy under the FMLA would have been 
limited to approximately $20 in babysitting bills.134 
Employees, such as Kevin Knussman, whose FMLA rights are 
violated, should have the means either to compel the provision of 
leave at the time needed, or to seek truly compensatory damages.  If 
the FMLA is to be of practical value to the workers it purports to 
protect, it must be rewritten. 
 
                                                          
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. at 38-39. 
 129. E.g., Knussman, 272 F.3d at 630. 
 130. See id. at 640. 
 131. See id. at 649. 
 132. See id. at 640-41 (indicating a “lack of zest for life” among Knussman’s 
symptoms of anxiety and depression). 
 133. See id. at 639-40; see also Symposium, supra note 27, at 36. 
 134. See Symposium, supra note 27, at 37. 
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